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This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods 
often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to 
the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the 
purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of 
first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by 
which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of 
perception. I illustrate this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologist 
and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception. 
 
1. Introduction: Introspection and First-Person Methods 
In the course of recent interest in the methods of consciousness studies and cognitive 
neuroscience, quite a few arguments have been made to the effect that introspective reports are a 
valuable – and indeed necessary – source of data. While this may seem obvious to anybody 
working in consciousness studies, or even in the more traditional field of psychophysics, it is not 
uncontroversial. One reason for this is that the terminology of introspection is used fairly loosely, 
and it is not always clear that scholars arguing about the value of introspection all have in mind 
the same thing. These terminological differences can have their roots in both philosophical and 
scientific differences (or some combination of the two). For example, there are several competing 
philosophical accounts of introspection (Robbins 2006). In turn, scientific accounts of 
introspection tend to make fairly substantial assumptions about the ways in which introspection 
fits in with various other cognitive functions and capacities, such as attention, control, 
metacognition, and the like (e.g., Schooler 2002). Given these different approaches and accounts, 
it may seem that in order to engage in fruitful discussions about the epistemic value of 
introspective data, one will need to get clear on what one means by “introspection,” and that this 
will require a substantive engagement with (and evaluation of) the philosophical and theoretical 
presuppositions that enter into such debates (I have argued this in Feest 2012). 
In this paper, I will take a different approach, however: Rather than venturing into a 
debate over the nature of introspection, I shall avoid this terminology (though of course much of 
what I say touches on topics that are debated in the introspection literature). Instead, I will refer 
only to “first-person methods”. I shall assume that first-person methods allow for the production 
of first-person data, i.e., the kinds of data one gets as a result of asking subjects to report some 
aspects of what they take to be their own mental content. This approach allows me to remain 
agnostic with respect to the nature of introspection since it does not commit me to the idea that 
first-person data are always mediated by introspective processes (whatever those may be). Nor 
does it commit me to the idea that they are always mediated by the same kinds of processes 
(introspective or not). 
Having thus slightly broadened the focus in one respect, I also intend to narrow it in 
another respect, looking at the use of first-person methods in the study perception, specifically on 
the use of first-person reports about phenomenal experience in the study of perception. Existing 
debates often focus on the question of whether the data generated by first-person methods qualify 
as properly scientific data, in particular turning on questions about the veridicality of first-person 
reports. Drawing on experiments and methodological reflections of Gestalt psychological 
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accounts of perception, I will argue that veridicality does not seem to be of great concern. Instead 
I will draw attention to the artificiality or ‘constructedness’ of the experiences reported in this 
research. The thesis of this paper is that while this constructedness does not make first-person 
reports of phenomenal experiences problematic per se, it does raise intriguing epistemological 
questions about their relevance to questions about the nature of perception. 
 
2. First-Person Methods and Phenomenal Experience: Some Background 
There are different kinds of things a person can report about themselves: They can report their 
own phenomenal subjective experience; they can report non-phenomenal mental states (e.g., 
intentions or preferences), or, even more broadly, personality traits (see Robbins 2006, who refers 
to these as primary, secondary and tertiary introspection). In this paper, I will exclusively focus 
on first-order questions, i.e., first-person reports of phenomenal mental states. One field of 
research where this question is obviously pertinent is psychophysics, an area of experimental 
psychology that aims at correlating physical stimuli and various features of subjective experience 
in order to learn something about human perception. Obviously, if a science of perception 
requires data about subjective phenomenal experience, first-person reports are going to be 
necessary. In other words, we have to work with first-person reports as evidence for subjective 
experiences.
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Much of the philosophical literature about introspection has focused on the question of 
whether first-person data can be scientific, and how it can be determined that such reports are 
veridical, given the subjectivity both of their object (phenomenal experience) and of their source 
(the experiencing subject). In response to these questions, Piccinini (2009) gives a two-fold 
answer: First, he points out that the scientific data in question are not the introspectively 
accessible experiences as such, but the public reports of such experiences. Secondly, he argues, 
the veridicality of these reports can be validiated by intersubjective means. While I am in full 
agreement with the first point, I am less confident about the second point (see also Feest 2012). 
However, it seems to me that at least in the field of psychophysics scientists do not seem to be 
overly worried about the veridicality of the reports in the first place. But if we want to pursue a 
type of philosophy of science that is sensitive to real scientific concerns, the question is what they 
do worry about? I argue that they worry about whether a given experiential report elicited in an 
experiment licenses the inferences the experimenter hopes to make. 
To get a better grip on this worry, we need to look more closely at the specific purposes to 
which scientists put first-person reports. Specifically, if we are interested in the status of first-
person reports about phenomenal experience in a given investigative context, we should be clear 
(1) what are the experimental methods scientists use to determine phenomenal experience, (2) 
what do scientists hope to find out about perception by doing so, and (3) how can it be 
determined that the purpose has been met successfully in a given experiment? With these 
questions, I hope to get away from general philosophical puzzles about first-person methods, 
asking instead what are criteria for determining their scientific utility in specific contexts.  
In the following section, we begin with a brief discussion of the first two questions. This 
discussion takes as a point of departure a historical debate between two early 20
th
 century schools 
in the experimental study of perception (Gestalt psychologists and atomists), both of whom used 
first-person reports of phenomenal experience as their empirical data. I will show that they 
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 Notice, though, that this assumption relies on two premises, namely (a) that “psychophysics” is understood as a 
matching of stimuli with sensations (rather than, for example, discriminatory behavior), and (b) that sensations are 
accessible and reportable by the subject who has them (thanks to Trey Boone for prompting me to clarify this). 
3 
 
disagreed about basic methodological questions in a way that directly corresponded with their 
respective conceptions of the aims of a psychology of perception.  
 
3. Phenomenological and Non-Phenomenological Methods  
In the literature it is sometimes suggested that specifically “phenomenological” methods in have 
an important place in contemporary perception research (Hatfield 2005). This invites the question 
whether there are also non-phenomenological methods and how the difference is to be 
characterized. Some insights can be gained by contrasting the phenomenological approach 
championed by the Gestalt psychologists in early 20
th
-century research on perception, contrasting 
it with the methods of their atomistic rivals in the Wundtian tradition. I will argue that both 
methods aim at eliciting reports about phenomenal experience, and both can be considered 
psychophysical. Where they differed was in their conceptions of the aims of perceptual research, 
and this had a direct impact on the kinds of experiments they conducted. 
 
3.1 Gestalt Psychology and the Phenomenological Method 
To get a sense of what constitutes a “phenomenological” method, it is instructive to turn to one of 
the classical experiments conducted by Wertheimer in 1910 (see Wertheimer 1912). His research 
was informed by the recognition that when we see two separate stimuli in short succession, we 
perceive the first stimulus as moving towards the location of the second, and he aimed at 
determining the precise conditions under which this phenomenon occurred. Wertheimer’s 
methodology consisted in (a) carefully varying the experimental setup (the time interval, the 
spatial separation, the form of the stimulus, etc.), and (b) paying close attention to the resulting 
phenomenal experience. In a nutshell, Wertheimer found that when the time interval is long (200 
milliseconds), the two lights are perceived as alternating, when it is very short (30 milliseconds), 
they are perceived as flashing simultaneously. However, in between (60 milliseconds or slightly 
less), the observer either perceives a moving light flash, or simply a movement. This perception 
of pure movement is what Wertheimer referred to as the “phi-phenomenon.” 
What makes this method “phenomenological”? I suggest three answers. First, subjects’ 
descriptions like “I see pure movement” are given a fundamental authority. In other words, there 
is no conceptual space for the possibility that subjects might be deceived about what they are 
‘really’ experiencing. Second, and relatedly, the research aims to find out which constellations of 
stimuli gives rise to which kinds of experiences in subjects. Third, the experiments are 
exploratory in the sense that they vary stimuli in order to determine the physical conditions that 
give rise to the appearance in question. In other words, the research is descriptive. Hatfield 
(2005) has singled out the second feature of Gestalt-psychological experiments as 
“introspective.” While I think that the terminology of introspection my well end up having a 
legitimate place, I prefer the terminology of first-person reports at this points, in part because it 
seems counter-intuitive to describe subjects’ reports as introspective when they are describing 
something that they perceive as being located in the outside world. 
The very rigorous set-up of the types of experiments championed by Wertheimer and his 
colleagues presents some arguments against worries about the potentially arbitrary nature of first-
person reports, which arise from the fact that we don’t have very stable intuitions about what we 
are ‘really’ experiencing. For example, Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that it is not clear whether 
my phenomenal experience of a coin is determined by what I know about it (that it is round) or 
whether it is determined by what I see when taking a painterly attitude (elliptical). In response 
Hatfield (2005) points to empirical research that suggests that such ambiguities can be reduced if 
subjects are properly instructed: It has to be made clear to them that they are expected to report 
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neither the objective shape (what they know the shape of the object to be) nor the projective 
shape (what they know the projection on their retina to be). Once this has been done, Hatfield 
argues, one can get fairly robust results about shape constancy. This is precisely what the 
example of the phi-phenomenon illustrates, since Wertheimer’s experimental set-up aimed at 
(and succeeded in) eliciting robust responses. On the other hand, however, one might worry that 
the experimental stability comes at a cost, namely that the experimental instructions are 
specifically designed to produce data that fit with the experimenter’s expectations. We will return 
to this issue below. 
 
3.2 A Non-Phenomenological Approach to Phenomenal Experience 
I argue that the phenomenological approach outlined above qualifies as ‘psychophysical.’ This is 
also backed by Wertheimer’s own assessment (see Feest forthcoming). Having outlined the aims 
and methods of a phenomenologically oriented approach to psychophysics, what might a rival 
non-phenomenological approach look like? And what rationale is there for saying that such a 
non-phenomenal approach is also one that prompts phenomenal experience and elicits self-
reports of such experiences? 
Historically, prominent advocates of a non-phenomenological approach to phenomenal 
experience were members of the Wundtian school of sensory psychology. They saw their task as 
that of identifying the basic atoms of experience, and they sought to identify those by presenting 
subjects with isolated stimuli, designed to create ‘isolated’ basic sensations. While Wundtians 
were aware of the fact that we don’t experience such basic sensations, they believed that the more 
complex sensations we do have can be decomposed into basic ones, even if we are not 
consciously aware of them under normal perceptual circumstances. The point of their 
experiments, then, was to make these basic sensations accessible to conscious awareness. 
Wundtian atomists were convinced that the project of explaining complex experiential states 
would ultimately have to make recourse to such elements. By contrast, Gestalt psychologists 
emphasized the primacy of holistic perception (for example the perception of movement as a 
function of a constellation of stimuli), and held that even when it seems possible to analyze a 
complex experience into parts, these are after-the-fact abstractions and do not represent the 
constituents of holistic experiences, and hence that no psychological explanations of the kind 
envisioned by Wundtians were to be had. 
I argue that if a subject is asked to report their experience of a given atomistic external 
stimulus (or the relationship between two stimuli), and they answer (for example), “bright” or 
“red,” or “equally bright,” there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which they are reporting a 
phenomenal experience. In this sense, then, I suggest that the atomistic approach, like the holistic 
approach of the Gestalt psychologists, elicits reports about phenomenal experience. The 
difference between the two, I suggest, is that they differed (a) in what they conceives to be the 
purpose of gathering such reports, and (b) consequently they differed in the kinds of experimental 
stimuli and instructions they present to their subjects: Whereas the phenomenologically oriented 
Gestalt psychologists wanted to determine the empirical conditions under which first-person 
reports of particular experiences can be elicited, the non-phenomenologically oriented atomistic 
psychologist sought to identify the basic constituents of human perception, which they thought to 
correspond to basic stimuli. This accounts for the different kinds of experiments they each 
designed.
2
 However, while the rationales for their experiments differed, I would argue that there 
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 It seems to me that Mazviita Chirimuuta, in her contribution to this panel, is getting at a related idea with her 
distinction between minimally introspective and introspection-heavy methods (the introspection-heavy being the 
one I refer to as “phenomenological”).  
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was nothing as such wrong with the first-person reports generated by either of them. Rather, the 
epistemologically more interesting feature of their respective empirical data was the extent to 
which they were the outcomes of very carefully designed experiments. 
 
4. The Artificial and the Artifactual 
In the previous section I have drawn attention to the fact that different schools in the psychology 
of perception design very different kinds of experiments to elicit first-person reports about 
phenomenal experience. Both the stimulus material and the instructions are designed to (and did) 
produce robust empirical results. Robustness of first-person reports is no guarantee for 
veridicality. Still, I believe that the discussion shifts our attention away from issues of 
veridicality, highlighting instead the question of how to adjudicate competing robust 
experimental results that are both based on first-person reports.  
The case studies direct our attention to the role of the experimenter and the extent to 
which first-person data (like other experimental data) are constructed and artificial. They result 
from specific arrangements of stimuli and experimental instructions. The art of experimenting is 
exhibited to a significant extent in the ability to create robust results. This is achieved by 
presenting ‘the right kinds’ of stimuli, and making the experimental instructions as unambiguous 
as possible, such that all subjects do roughly the same thing in response to the stimuli presented 
to them. Now we can return to the question already raised above, namely whether the artificiality 
of the experimental set up and the constructedness of the experimental data further or undermine 
their purpose of contributing to our understanding of perception? I suggest that in addressing this 
question we need to distinguish between (a) the fact that experimental set-ups are artificial and 
(b) the question of whether the experimental results are artifacts. 
The worry that scientific experiments in perception research create phenomena not 
ordinarily found outside the laboratory was explicitly addressed by Kurt Koffka (1923), who 
argued that all experiments about perception create perceptual experiences that differ from the 
ones subjects might have (even of the same stimuli) if they were not participating in an 
experiment. For Koffka, this was a simple consequence of the fact that the subjects of an 
experiment are instructed to do certain things, which creates a mental “set” [Einstellung]: 
“Every psychological description … presupposes a set, which is different from that of 
normal life, where we are directed towards entirely different goals than that of 
description. Hence, every description will find phenomena that are novel vis-à-vis 
ordinary phenomena; phenomena that are changed in some way or other” (Koffka 
1934, 383; my translation).
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Koffka did not view this as an objection to the experimental study of perception, arguing that 
such experiments aim at substituting ordinary experiences with experiences that are illuminating 
with respect to perception. The job of the experimenter, according to him, was to ensure that 
subjects are in the right kind of “set.” In other words, Koffka fully acknowledged the active role 
of the experimenter in creating specific types of first-person reports. In this respect, Gestalt 
psychologists and atomists were obviously on a par; they played equally active roles in creating 
experimental conditions that gave rise to experiences that they deemed to be illuminating with 
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 “Jede psychologische Deskription – wie jede Deskription überhaupt – setzt bereits eine Einstellung voraus, die 
verschieden ist von der Einstellung des gewöhnlichen Lebens, in dem wir auf ganz andere Ziele gerichtet sind als 
auf Beschreibung. Jede Deskription wird also notwendig Phänomene vorfinden, die neu sind gegenüber 
gewöhnlichen Phänomenen, die, in welcher Weise immer … verändert sind.“ 
6 
 
respect to perception. Yet they disagreed with each other both over the value of their respective 
experimental set-ups and about the results they purported to find.  
 One way to construe the disagreement is to say that while both acknowledged that they 
were actively constructing specific first-person reports, they each accused each other of drawing 
faulty conclusions, resulting in ‘findings’ that were essentially artifacts of faulty background 
assumptions about the aims of psychology and the nature of the mind, and they held that the other 
party’s faulty background assumptions were already built into the very experiments they 
conducted. More specifically, atomists charged that the fact that we don’t perceive elements of 
sensation under normal conditions does not mean that there are no such elements, and Gestalt 
psychologists charged that the fact that such elements can (seemingly) be isolated under specific 
experimental conditions does not mean that they play any role in normal perception.  
 
5. The Problem with First-Person Reports as Arbiters, and a Proposed Solution 
As we saw, the disagreement just outlined was neither about the robustness nor about the 
veridicality of the first-person reports generated by either party. Rather, it was about whether 
those results were relevant to the task of “saying something illuminating about perception,” i.e., 
whether they established what each party claimed, i.e., (in the case of atomists) that perception 
can be decomposed into elementary sensations, and (in the case of Gestaltists) that the most basic 
and immediate experiences are structured in ways that correspond to certain stimulus 
configurations. In this final section, I will argue that this disagreement was not resolvable by 
appeal to the empirical data (i.e., the first-person reports). In response to the question of how the 
disagreement could possibly be resolved, I will suggest that we turn to broader methodological 
considerations. Again, the historical case gives us some intriguing insights. 
 
5.1 Problems with First-Person Reports as Arbiters 
Rhetorically, Gestalt psychologists often appealed to the external validity and the face validity of 
their findings, emphasizing (a) that their experimental data clearly resembled ordinary experience 
much more closely than those of Wundtian atomists, and (b) that their empirical findings simply 
showed them to be right, because (for example) the subjects in Wertheimer’s phi-experiment did 
not report experiencing simple elements of sensation. However, as we just saw, they were well 
aware that things weren’t that easy. There are two reasons for this. The first was the one already 
discussed, namely that they recognized that the mere artificiality of the Wundtian data did not 
discredit them from being genuine scientific data, and that in fact their own data were artificial, 
too. The second reason was that they realized that the first-person reports themselves could not 
decide for or against atomism either way. The fact that atoms of experience are not normally 
experienced, except under the special conditions of a Wundtian experiment, could not be 
appealed to as evidence against Wundt, because he did not claim that these elemental experiences 
were accessible under normal conditions. This is precisely why he sought to isolate them in 
special experiments. In this vein Wundt argued that we also do not perceive physical atoms, and 
yet they are useful and valid explanatory constructs in physics (Wundt 1907). 
The fact that this conflict did not seem to have a straightforward empirical resolution, had 
been recognized by the Gestalt psychologist, Wolfgang Köhler already some 10 years earlier, 
when he stated that “the refutation [of the view that there are unnoticed sensations and 
judgments] by observation and experimentation … must be considered hopeless, since it is 
precisely one of the basic assumptions of this view that there is unnoticed, even unnoticeable, 
psychological content, and thus, it can be seen, the relevance of observation is excluded once and 
for all” (Köhler (1971 [1913]), 18). He thereby wished to make it clear that the Wundtian 
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approach should be treated with some respect as a rival scientific hypothesis rather than simply 
an article of faith. Having established that they were both reasonable scientific hypotheses and 
that they could not be adjudicated by appeal to first person reports, he proceeded to ask what 
other kinds of criteria one might possibly appeal to when trying to decide between them. 
 
5.2 Köhler and the Appeal to Epistemic Virtues 
In Köhler’s article “On Unnoticed Sensations and Errors of Judgment,” he criticized atomistic 
reasoning strategies not because their assumptions didn’t conform with ‘normal’ experience, but 
because they were too easy to come by. Specifically, he argued that (a) in cases where first 
person reports of experiences did not reveal elements of sensation, it was too easy to say that 
those sensations were there but were “unnoticed,” whereas (b) in cases where first person reports 
did not match what one would have predicted on the basis of the presumed elements of sensation 
(for example, in the case of optical illusions), it was too easy to say that the sensations had been 
distorted by an unnoticed error of judgment. He concluded: 
“Enough of this. These two auxiliary assumptions … are shown to be … general and 
incapable of being disproved in most individual cases. This is the first reason why 
these assumptions do not recommend themselves from a scientific and technical point 
of view. … It has been shown, in the second case, that no independent criteria exist in 
specific cases to decide … when we must have recourse to these assumptions and 
when we must, rather, accept an observation as an exception to the basic assumption. 
Thus the door is opened to arbitrariness.’ (Köhler 1913, 27/18). 
 
Essentially, then, Köhler appealed not to first-person reports to settle the disagreement, but rather 
to a specific understanding of scientific method. According to this understanding, auxiliary 
assumptions are permissible in scientific research only insofar as there are criteria that restrict the 
ways in which one can appeal to them. On his analysis, the problem with the atomistic hypothesis 
was neither that its experiments used first-person reports, nor that those reports contradicted those 
gathered by Gestalt psychologists. Rather, it was that that too many ad hoc hypotheses were 
required to reconcile it with specific experimental findings. It would go beyond the scope of this 
paper to evaluate this line of argumentation in detail; however it is worth noting that it 
corresponds to something like the Kuhnian notion of epistemic values as guiding the choice of 
hypotheses (Kuhn 1972), and to the more recent literature about epistemic virtues of theories (see 
Tulodziecki 2012 for an overview). In this vein, it seems to me to be a fruitful avenue for future 
research to examine the ways in which different ways of constructing first-person reports are (or 
should be) be evaluated within the science of perception. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that while much of the debate about the value of first-person reports in 
psychology turns on their status as “scientific” and on their veridicality, philosophers of science 
until now have not paid much attention to the extent to which first person reports (like other kinds 
of data) are highly artificial and carefully constructed by experimental means, often with an eye 
to specific research projects. This has prompted me to raise an epistemological question 
stemming from the fact that that even psychologists of perception who agree on the value of first-
person data can disagree deeply about what the data reveal about human perception. The reason 
for this, I suggested, is, that even where scientists have no reason to doubt each other’s data, they 
may still have fundamental differences over the value of the very experimental set-ups that went 
into their production, and hence over the inferences one can legitimately draw from the data. I 
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illustrated this point by recounting a discussion that took place in the early 20
th
 century between 
atomistic and holistic approaches to the psychology of perception. Both, I argued, constructed 
their experiments with specific background assumption in mind. I showed that ultimately their 
disagreement was not about the first-person reports as such, and that moreover the first-person 
reports could not settle their differences, thus drawing attention to the question of what other 
criteria one might turn to. 
An obvious response to the argument of this paper is to ask about the status of the 
historical case study, thus raising the question of whether this case is representative of 
epistemological issues that arise in connection to more recent research as well. I would argue that 
the historical case brings out the issues in a particularly clear way, in part because the historical 
actors explicitly reflected on them in their methodological writings. However, the relevance of 
these reflections goes beyond the narrow confines of this particular case, since they arise from the 
recognition of the high degree of craftsmanship of experimental research, and to the 
constructedness and artificiality of experimental data (including first-person reports) in the 
science of perception. The constructedness of first-person reports in the experimental 
investigation of perception does not invalidate them per se, but it does raise questions about the 
inferences they license about the nature of perception. More specifically, it raises questions about 
the criteria that should determine our judgment of whether or not a given experimental result is 
illuminating with respect to perception.
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